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What is art? This has been a disputed question, and attempts 
to answer it have come from different perspectives.1 Some have 
addressed the question on a conceptual level, others in a more 
non-conceptual way. In the fi rst category one fi nds theorists who 
discuss what art is, in the second artists whose works of art chall-
enge our conception of what art is, the most famous being Andy 
Warhol.2 It would be unreasonable to hold that only one of these 
categories should infl uence our conception of what art is. A bet-
ter suggestion is that contributions from both categories, directly 
or indirectly, shed light on something that should be examined 
from different perspectives.3
The issue of the nature of art can also be understood as a se-
mantic issue. Art is what the word ‘art’ applies to. This means that 
if one knows what the word ‘art’ applies to, or alternatively what 
the concept of art applies to, then one also knows what art is. One 
way of addressing the issue of the nature of art is therefore to ask 
what the meaning of ‘art’ is.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to an answer to this ques-
tion by applying an infl uential radical interpretation theory from 
philosophy of language. The basic idea in this theory is that one 
can arrive at knowledge of what sentences mean on the basis 
of knowledge of the conditions that make sentences true. Such 
explications of truth-conditions of sentences involving ‘art’ are 
meaning-explications of ‘art’, but they should not be understood 
as traditional defi nitions, as such defi nitions have been criticised 
in the spirit of the later Wittgenstein.4 The explications should 
rather be understood, in a sense to be explained, as elements in 
an unarticulated conception of art.
It will be argued that these explications are important for sev-
eral reasons. The most important is that they are plausible. Stan-
dard objections to analyses of the concept of art hold that the 
analyses do not include something that should fall under the con-
cept.5 The conception of explication in radical interpretation, on 
the other hand, is aimed at the meaning of the word ‘art’ within 
the whole language that is interpreted. That is why the explica-
tions are meaning-explications. A second reason why the expli-
cations are important is that further theoretical analyses of the 
concept of art should be consistent with meaning-explications 
of ‘art’, as the word is understood within the language we use. It 
will also be argued that the radical interpretation approach has 
plausible metaphysical and epistemological implications for the 
meaning of ‘art’.
I will fi rst give an introduction to the philosophical theory of 
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radical interpretation, as originally developed by Willard Quine 
and later modifi ed by Donald Davidson. I will apply this theory 
to ‘art’ and then give reasons for actually doing so. I will then 
compare the radical interpretation approach with Morris Weitz’ 
‘open concept’ argument and Arthur Danto’s ‘philosophical’ defi -
nition of art.
2. Radical interpretation
Suppose I traveled to a remote island where there is a linguistic 
community that speak a language I have never heard of before. 
In order to understand the speakers I have to start from scratch; 
I know nothing about the meaning of any of their utterances, so I 
am not only an interpreter, I am a radical interpreter. From pair-
ing their utterances systematically with their behaviour and ex-
ternal objects around them my task is to come up with plausible 
suggestions as to what their utterances mean.
In philosophy of language this idea of radical interpretation 
is primarily associated with the American philosophers Willard 
Quine and Donald Davidson. Quine was originally concerned 
with establishing what has been called the ‘indeterminacy of 
meaning’. Quine wanted to show that meaning is indeterminate 
in the sense that it is always logically possible to arrive at two dif-
ferent translations that fi t the use of the target language equally 
well:
The thesis is this: manuals for translating one language into another can 
be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech 
dispositions, yet incompatible with one another.6
Davidson has been much infl uenced by Quine’s arguments, but 
he has in an important sense a more positive view on meaning.7 
The most fundamental difference is this: Quine seems to think 
that in order for words to have determinate meaning one has to 
get hold of some defi nite mental meanings, some ‘inner ideas’ 
that speakers express by their utterances.8 Since it is impossible 
to get hold of such defi nite ‘inner ideas’, since competing theories 
that posit different ideas will match the evidence equally well, 
meaning is indeterminate according to Quine. Davidson shares 
Quine’s scepticism about the conception that we have access to 
defi nite ideas ‘inside the heads’ of speakers, but he draws a dif-
ferent conclusion. Davidson thinks that since the access-to-inner-
idea conception is so manifestly false, we should not accept that 
it has to be true in order for meaning to be determinate. Davidson 
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thinks that the falsity of the conception should lead us to think 
of meaning in an entirely different way, as essentially connected 
to language:
What is important is that if meaning and belief are interlocked as I have 
suggested, then the idea that each belief has a defi nite object, and the idea 
that each word and sentence has a defi nite meaning, cannot be invoked in 
describing the goal of a successful [radical interpretation] theory.9
Meaning is still indeterminate, but only in the sense that “when 
all the evidence is in, alternative ways of stating the facts remain 
open”.10 
From his starting point a radical interpreter does not know 
what the object language means. In accordance with the rejec-
tion of the inner idea picture of meaning it is also important that 
he does not assume that the speakers have defi nite inner mental 
ideas that they express by their utterances. From such a starting 
point it is, according to Davidson, possible to arrive at a theory of 
meaning for the object language:
A theory of interpretation for an object language may then be viewed 
as the result of the merger of a structurally revealing theory of inter-
pretation for a known language, and a system of translation from the 
unknown language into the known.11 
Davidson’s fundamental idea is that one can arrive at such a 
theory by assigning truth-conditions to utterances of the object 
language. Consider the following sentence:
(1) The sentence ‘Vann er vått’ is true if and only if water is wet.
It would fall outside the main focus here to explain Davidson’s 
theory of truth and truth-conditions in details, but the fundamen-
tal idea is not too complicated. That idea is that via T-sentences 
(as they are called) like (1), one can get from a position where one 
does not take meaning but only truth for granted, to a position 
where one also knows what a sentence means. On the left side of 
the phrase ‘_ is true if and only if _’ a sentence is mentioned: by 
placing it within quotation marks we have not taken it for grant-
ed what it means. On the right hand side a sentence is used, as we 
understand it in our own language. The whole T-sentence trans-
lates the mentioned sentence by stating its truth-conditions.
By systematically studying the behaviour of speakers of the ob-
ject language, by comparing their utterances with objects in their 
environment and other utterances they make, one can formulate 
plausible T-sentences for their sentences. According to Davidson, 
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since the T-sentences specify truth conditions they tell us what 
the sentences of the object language mean.12 
The above sentence was construed as an interpretation of a 
Norwegian utterance into an English. But the theory also applies 
within languages. We are, according to Davidson, all radical in-
terpreters:
The problem of interpretation is domestic as well as foreign: it surfaces 
for speakers of the same language in the form of the question: how can 
it be determined that the language is the same? … All understanding of 
the speech of another involves radical interpretation.13 
Davidson’s point is that interpretation of other speakers always 
has to be based on systematic studies of their behaviour and en-
vironment. The situation is in principle the same whether inter-
pretation happens within languages or from one language into 
another.14 The difference is only that when one assumes that 
another person really speaks the same language as oneself, the 
T-sentences become homogenous; the sentence that is mentioned 
is also used. For the sentence ‘Snow is white’ the T-sentence with-
in English becomes
(2) The sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is 
white. 
As with a translation from one language into another this T-sen-
tence specifi es the meaning of a sentence. One the left side of the 
predicate ‘_is true if and only if_’ the sentence is mentioned, not 
used. No meaning is therefore taken for granted. On the right 
side of the truth-predicate the sentence is used with its ordinary 
meaning taken for granted. A statement of its truth-conditions 
translates the mentioned sentence. In this way the concept of 
truth bridges the gap between the the non-semantic and the se-
mantic.
4. A complication
There is one complication that should be addressed before it can 
be explained how one can use radical interpretation on the word 
’art’. Consider the two T-sentences
(3) The sentence ‘Water is wet’ is true if and only if water is wet.
(4) The sentence ‘H
2
O is wet’ is true if and only if water is wet.
Both (3) and (4) are true. Since the right hand sides of these two 
T-sentences are identical, the idea that we can specify meaning 
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by specifying truth-conditions seems to imply that the men-
tioned sentences have the same meaning. But only (3) specifi es 
the meaning of the sentence of the object language, for the word 
‘H
2
O’ does not mean the same as ‘water’. The reason is this: con-
sider a person with a normal ‘layman’ understanding of ’water’ 
who does not have chemical knowledge. Such a person does not 
accept ‘Water is H
2
O’. If ’water’ meant the same as ‘H
2
O’ then any-




Davidson’s original solution to this problem was that one can 
fi nd the correct truth-conditions, the conditions that really illumi-
nate meaning, by using what he called ‘the principle of charity’. 
This principle says that if one has to choose between two com-
peting T-sentences, or more generally two competing translation 
manuals, one should choose the one that to the largest extent 
makes the utterances of the object language true.16 
However, this strategy does not have the needed resources for 
excluding true sentences like (4) from the translation manual. 
What one needs is a constraint on radical interpretation that 
implies that sentences like (4) do not end up in the translation 
manual, even though they are true and therefore formulated in 
accordance with the principle of charity.
John Foster and John McDowell have suggested such a strate-
gy.17 They suggest that Davidson’s principle of charity is replaced 
with a principle of intelligibility. According to this principle one, 
should not simply choose the T-sentences that maximise truth. 
One should choose the T-sentences that make the speakers of the 
object language as intelligible as possible, viewed from our own 
perspective. The sentence (4) does not maximise intelligibility in 
the same way as (3). Consider again the above non-expert about 
the microstructure of water who utters ‘water is wet’. If it is pos-
tulated that his sentence means that H
2
O is wet, then we should 
also expect him to assent to sentences like ‘Water is H
2
O’ or at 
least to have some chemical knowledge. His refusal to accept ‘Wa-
ter is H
2
O’ would be unintelligible.
The principle of intelligibility is also reasonable for another 
reason. Suppose we are to interpret a group of speakers who 
have a religion that is signifi cantly different from what we be-
lieve in. The principle of charity dictates that we do not report 
these speakers as having religious beliefs that we think are mas-
sively false. But the right thing to do, intuitively, is to report them 
as having such beliefs. If one uses the principle of intelligibility, 
then one can ascribe to them such beliefs. One is able to explain 
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These objections to the strict use of the principle of charity 
seem persuasive. The idea of radical interpretation should not be 
paired with the principle of charity but with the more compre-
hensive principle of intelligibility.
In the following I will assume that the radical interpretation 
approach is an approach to meaning that is plausible. The ques-
tion before us is how the approach has signifi cance for the issue 
of what ‘art’ applies to. One could discuss the theory in connec-
tion with expressions in other languages that would be translated 
into ‘art’, like the Norwegian ‘kunst’. As emphasised, radical inter-
pretation is a general theory about meaning.
5. Radical interpretation and ‘art’
An important idea in radical interpretation theory is, as showed 
above, that all understanding of the speech of another involves 
radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is not just some-
thing one explicitly can use in order to interpret other speakers. 
It is something we use all the time, also when we interpret ‘art’ 
utterances of people who speak the same language as ourselves. 
This is not, obviously, something we are introspectively aware of. 
But the reason for holding that we use radical interpretation is 
not that we are consciously aware of this. The reason, Davidson 
would hold, is that the only way to understand a speaker and 
more generally a language is to use radical interpretation.
Suppose, then, that a speaker who seems to be a fairly nor-
mal competent speaker of English sincerely utters ‘Mona Lisa is a 
piece of art’. This constitutes plausible evidence for interpreting 
his utterance by the following T-sentence:
(5) The sentence ‘Mona Lisa is a piece of art’ is true if and only 
if Mona Lisa is a piece of art.
Suppose also that the speaker sincerely assents to ‘Art can be 
beautiful’. This sentence is interpreted like this:
(6) The sentence ‘Art can be beautiful’ is true if and only if art 
can be beautiful.
The sentences (5) and (6) tell the interpreter something about 
what the speaker means by ‘art’. (5) tells him that the speaker un-
derstands the word ‘art’ such that it applies to the object that is in 
NET 31 2005 Inlaga.indd   10 05-09-08   13.35.23
11art and radical interpretation
18   T. Burge, ‘Intellectual Norms and 
the Foundations of Mind’ The Journal of 
Philosophy 83, 1986. One of Burge’s ex-
amples involves the idea that ‘Furniture 
that more than one person can sit in’ is a 
meaning-explication of ‘sofa’. 
fact the painting Mona Lisa. (6) tells him that the speaker thinks 
the word applies to some possible object that is beautiful. 
A statement that explicitly says something about, or has obvi-
ous implications for, what an expression means can be regarded 
as a meaning-explication of the expression.18 The statement ‘A 
bachelor is an unmarried man’ is a meaning explication of the 
word ‘bachelor’. As I understand the idea of a meaning-explica-
tion here, every statement that contains minimal or substantial 
information about a term’s application conditions is a meaning-
explication of that term. In this sense (5) and (6) are meaning-ex-
plications of ‘art’ as the word is understood by the speaker in the 
imagined example. They say something about what ‘art’ means 
for the speaker when they say something about what ‘art’ applies 
to for the speaker.   
(5), (6) and other T-sentences derived from interpretation of the 
speaker can help an interpreter towards a more complete mean-
ing-explication of ‘art’ as the word is understood by the speaker. 
The interpreter fi nds himself with a long conjunction like the 
following: ‘Art can be beautiful and Mona Lisa is a piece of art 
and p and q and…’ where ‘p’ and ‘q’ are right hand sides of other 
T-sentences. Such a complex conjunction constitutes, from the 
interpreter’s point of view, a more complete meaning-explication 
of the word ‘art’ in the speaker’s idiolect. 
Not all sentences involving ‘art’ that the speaker is willing to 
assent to will be regarded as equally important. Two grammati-
cally different sentences might also contain the same informa-
tion (compare ‘Art is made by artists’ and ‘Artists make art’). Some 
sentences will also be more informative about the speaker’s un-
derstanding of ‘art’ than others (compare the uninformative ’Art 
is made by artists’ and (5) above). By arranging the information 
contained in the complex conjunction derived from the T-sen-
tences it might be that the interpreter can arrive at a less complex 
meaning-explication of ‘art’. However, it is not given in advance 
that this can be done. Radical interpretation theory, as I under-
stand the approach here, is neutral with respect to this further 
issue.
So far I have focused on an imagined ‘one-to-one’ case where 
one interpreter interprets one speaker, but the situation is in 
principle the same for a whole language. A person’s conception 
of what ‘art’ means within English is based on interpretation of 
speakers he regards as speakers of English. Sentences involving 
‘art’ they assent to constitute the basis for T-sentences that par-
tially specify the meaning of ‘art’. Suppose an interpreter thinks 
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that speakers of English are willing to assent to (5) and (6). Then 
he will regard (5) and (6) as partial meaning-explications of the 
English word ‘art’.
It would be wrong, of course, to assume a priori that all compe-
tent speakers assent to (5) and (6). But successful radical interpre-
tation is not dependent on it being clear what competent speak-
ers agree about. Radical interpretation is very much a ‘fl oating 
enterprise’. Conceptions of what ‘art’ means are formed. When 
new evidence emerges these conceptions are revised. This is ex-
actly the same process as the process a fi eld linguist goes through 
when his aim is to make an explicit translation of a foreign lan-
guage.
There would be something special about ‘art’ if the word had 
no meaning-explication at all. But it has an explication, the rea-
son is this: the word ‘art’ is an English word. One might think that 
its meaning is somewhat vague, but it has surely some determi-
nate meaning (Compare ‘art’ with a meaningless sound. People 
also tend to accept, for instance, sentences like ‘The word “art” is 
a noun that applies to many sculptures and paintings that can be 
found in museums’.)19
According to radical interpretation theory, ‘art’ gets its mean-
ing in radical interpretation. The only way ‘art’ could get meaning 
in such a process is in T-sentences that translate utterances that 
involve ‘art’. But such T-sentences are, as shown above, identical 
to meaning-explications.
6. The meaning of ‘art’
How is the radical interpretation approach relevant for analyses 
of the concept of art? It is relevant in the trivial sense that ‘art’ 
means art. If one thinks of the concept art as identical to what ‘art’ 
means, then a radical interpretation analysis of ‘art’ is an analysis 
of how one more precisely should understand the concept art.
The conception of the meaning of ‘art’ implicit in the radical in-
terpretation approach should, more precisely, be understood like 
this: the full explication of the meaning of ‘art’ is the explication in 
a complete interpretation of the English word ‘art’. The complete 
explication is, metaphysically, the set of meaning-specifying T-
sentences that contain all the information that is relevant for the 
meaning of ‘art’. As long as the radical interpretation approach is 
plausible in general, as I have assumed that it is, the constitutive 
implications for the meaning of ‘art’ are equally plausible. These 
implications can be understood in three different ways. 
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The metaphysics of meaning. The radical interpretation ap-
proach is inconsistent with other approaches. According to radi-
cal interpretation a speaker’s utterances get meaning within a 
‘third person perspective’, from the perspective of an interpreter. 
This is inconsistent with theories that hold that we have, from 
our different ‘fi rst person perspectives’, privileged access to what 
we mean by the words we use.20
Furthermore, according to the radical interpretation approach 
the meaning of ‘art’ is not a straightforward defi nition, inner idea 
or qualitative state associated with objects or properties that fall 
under the concept of art. It is also dubious that the approach is 
consistent with the idea that the meaning of ‘art’ is the total use 
of the word as this idea sometimes is associated with Wittgen-
stein.21 There are, after all, uses of ‘art’ that are not part of sincere 
utterances that will be translated by T-sentences.
Epistemology. I have emphasised the independence of the 
metaphysical and the epistemological aspects of radical interpre-
tation. The signifi cance of the approach for the question about 
the nature of art is very much connected to the metaphysical as-
pects, but some points should be made about the epistemological 
dimension.
Suppose that one wants to know what the meaning of ‘art’ is. 
If the radical interpretation approach is correct, this knowledge 
has to be arrived at through a radical interpretation process, not 
by examining one’s own understanding of the word. It would 
also be wrong to focus on inner experiences, associations or ex-
ternal objects with properties that one thinks fall under the con-
cept of art. In short, the theory of radical interpretation makes 
special assumptions about how one should proceed in order to 
fi nd meaning-explications of ‘art’, assumptions that are not made 
in traditional analyses of the concept of art. In discussions of the 
nature of art it has not, after all, been common to use notions as 
that of a T-sentence. 
Of course, it is a good question exactly what the correct mean-
ing-explications are. But one should really think of this inquiry 
as a process. If the aim is to decide what ‘art’ means the starting 
point should be to ask if there are ideas about art that English 
speakers seem to accept. Suggestions can then be modifi ed or 
falsifi ed on the basis of refl ection or empirical observations. The 
aim should be to fi nd something that seems reasonable in the 
light of the available evidence.
It is also important to remember that the diffi culties facing 
interpreters of ‘art’ are, in principle, exactly the same as those a 
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fi eld linguist faces when he interprets a totally new language. In 
both cases one needs to decide who are to count as speakers of 
the language, and one needs to decide when the empirical data 
are suffi ciently rich for forming plausible hypotheses about what 
the expressions mean. This means that it would be implausible 
to hold that the radical interpretation approach to the meaning 
of ‘art’ is unreasonable because of these diffi culties. For then one 
also has to accept that it is unreasonable for the fi eld linguist to 
use radical interpretation. But he has no other choice, and as long 
as we really manage to interpret new languages the diffi culties 
are somehow overcome.
A related equally unconvincing objection says that in deciding 
who are to count as competent users of ‘art’ one has to appeal to 
a conception of what ‘art’ means. The idea would be that only 
those who have this conception should be thought of as speak-
ers to be represented in the analysis. This would undermine the 
signifi cance of the radical interpretation approach. If one already 
knows what the correct conception of art is, then there is no point 
of using radical interpretation in order to determine what it is. 
The answer to this objection is again that translations of new 
languages must manage to decide who are to count as speakers of 
the language without knowledge of the content of the language 
in the fi rst place. As long as they succeed in doing that there is no 
reason why one cannot do the same in connection with ‘art’.
Reductionism. The radical interpretation approach is reduc-
tive in the sense that the meaning of ‘art’ is derived from a basis 
where one does not take the meaning of ‘art’ for granted. The 
basis is sincere ‘art’ utterances, behaviour and objects in the en-
vironment of speakers of the object language, specifi ed in a non-
semantic way.
This differs from theories that start out with some minimal 
view about what ‘art’ means, or what the concept of art applies to, 
and then seeks to build on or modify that view. The radical inter-
pretation approach therefore escapes circularity objections that 
have been raised against views such as the institutional defi ni-
tion of art. Carroll formulates this defi nition as the claim that an 
object x is a piece of art ‘if and only if (1) x is an artifact (2) upon 
which someone acting on behalf of a certain institution (the art 
world) confers the status of being a candidate for appreciation’.22 
In this defi nition the concept of art, or more precisely the concept 
of an art-world, is appealed to in the explanation of what art is. 
The defi nition is therefore circular and not fully explanatory. The 
radical interpretation approach escapes this problem.
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7. Conceptual analyses 
Before I make some points about conceptual analysis of the con-
cept of art it is necessary to say something about conceptual anal-
ysis in general.
As long as one accepts that some speakers of English might un-
derstand ‘art’ in a way that is different from how the word should 
be understood, one also has to accept that there is a conceptual 
distinction to be drawn between a normative correct understand-
ing of ‘art’ and a less-than-complete understanding that some 
people might have. Tyler Burge writes:
The expressions a subject uses take on a certain inertia in determining 
attributions of mental content to him. In particular, the expressions the 
subject uses sometimes provide the content of his mental states and 
events even though he only partially understands, or even misunder-
stands, some of them. Global coherence and responsibility seem some-
times to override localized incompetence.23
Burge’s infl uential idea is that a partial understanding of a term 
can be suffi cient for possessing the concept that the term liter-
ally expresses, if the person in question is willing to defer to the 
correct use of the term. Philosophers have often thought of such 
persons as ‘consumers’ of the correct understanding, while ex-
perts who have a complete understanding have been thought of 
as ‘producers’ of the correct understanding.24 Insofar as consum-
ers express the same concepts as producers they should also be 
regarded as speakers of the same language. An analysis of what 
speakers of a language mean by an expression, of what the pub-
lic meaning of the expression is, should therefore represent the 
understanding of both consumers and producers. A theoretical 
analysis of the normative correct understanding, on the other 
hand, should focus on a producer understanding.
A comparison with two clearer concepts can make the dis-
tinction between consumers and producers clearer. An analysis 
of what English speakers mean by ‘water’ will not purely be an 
analysis of the natural kind expert concept of water, the concept 
that applies to nothing but H
2
O. The reason is that some consum-
ers of ‘water’, speakers who use the word competently in normal 




While the ‘expert’ concept water is a natural kind concept, the 
concept of a carburetor is a functional concept. Every device that 
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has the function of mixing fuel and air into combustion engines 
is correctly called a ‘carburetor’. This is the expert understanding 
of ‘carburetor’ that producers have. A conceptual analysis of what 
the correct, normative understanding of ‘carburetor’ is should 
yield this understanding. But an explication of what the public 
content of ‘carburetor’ is cannot be the suggestion that ‘carbure-
tor’ simply means ‘device that mixes fuel and air into combustion 
engines’. For this defi nition does not represent the way consum-
ers understand the word.
Similarly with ‘art’. Analysing the producer understanding of 
‘art’ is one task. Just as in any other areas where one has done con-
ceptual analysis it is this normative understanding that theorists 
fi rst and foremost have focused on. This understanding is arrived 
at on the basis of theoretical refl ection, and one has traditionally 
invoked notions like representation and resemblance. To focus 
on what consumers and producers mean by ‘art’ is to adopt a 
more comprehensive focus. Radical interpretation of the English 
word ‘art’ has this more comprehensive focus.
It seems to me that many attempts to analyse the concept of 
art have not been clear about the producer-consumer distinction. 
In connection with the radical interpretation approach this has, 
I believe, implications for the plausibility of some well-known 
arguments. In the remainder of this section I will explain what 
I mean on the basis of a discussion of Morris Weitz’s ‘open con-
cept’ argument:
 ‘Art’ itself is an open concept. New conditions (cases) have constantly 
arisen and will undoubtedly constantly arise; new art forms, new mo-
vements will emerge, which will demand decisions on the part of those 
interested, usually professional critics, as to whether the concept should 
be extended or not. Aestheticians may lay down conditions but never 
necessary and suffi cient ones for the correct application of the concept. 
With ‘art’ its conditions of application can never be exhaustively enume-
rated since new cases can always be envisaged or created by artists or 
even nature, which would call for decision on someone’s part to extend 
or to close the old or invent a new concept.25
Weitz’ argument can be formulated as follows:
(P1) The ever-changing, ever-evolving concept of art has a con-
tent that no defi nition can capture.
(P2) If (P1), then it is not possible to defi ne what art is (art is an 
‘open concept’).
(C) It is not possible to defi ne what art is.
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The radical interpretation approach is consistent with (P1) when 
(P1) is understood as the claim that it is impossible to defi ne a 
producer understanding of ‘art’. The reason is that radical in-
terpretation is not targeted at analysing what producers of ‘art’ 
mean by ‘art’ . Whether or not it is possible to defi ne such an un-
derstanding is something the approach has no implications for.
 The radical interpretation approach, however, is inconsistent 
with (P2) as long as (P2) is understood as the claim that it is not 
possible to defi ne art at all. Weitz thinks that the impossibility of 
defi ning the concept of art by means of a theoretical vocabulary 
implies that it is not possible to defi ne what art is at all. But it is 
false to think that if it is not possible to defi ne the expert concept, 
then it is impossible to explicate what ‘art’ means in English. One 
should not accept (P2) without further argument.
The problem is in fact more acute since I have, in effect, argued 
against (P2). As long as ‘art’ has meaning, then the radical inter-
pretation approach guarantees that there is, metaphysically, an 
explication of its meaning in the form of T-sentences that trans-
late relevant information about the meaning of ‘art’. This explica-
tion specifi es what ‘art’ applies to and therefore gives suffi cient 
and necessary conditions for something to be art. An explication 
of this meaning is therefore a defi nition. (P2) is false since there 
is a defi nition of ‘art’.
But what about the claim that a defi nition must incorporate 
possible future changes? This is, again, too demanding. If there is 
a meaning-explication of what ‘art’ means at any given time, then 
that is a defi nition of art at that time. There is a meaning-explica-
tion at any given time. Since such explications are defi nitions 
there is therefore a defi nition at any given time.
Some would perhaps respond that Weitz never had the public 
meaning of ‘art’ in mind, that he never meant to focus on both 
consumers and producers. His conclusion could then be under-
stood as the idea that the impossibility to incorporate possible 
future changes means that it is not possible to defi ne a producer 
understanding. As said above, the radical interpretation approach 
has no strict implications for such a view. But it still suggests that 
there exists an expert defi nition. For as long as ‘art’ has a public 
meaning defi nition, why should it be impossible to defi ne a pro-
ducer understanding?
This might perhaps not be a full eternal defi nition, so Weitz’ 
idea that there is no such defi nition could be intact. But much of 
the air would go out of the balloon if there is, metaphysically, a 
defi nition of the expert concept. It is, at any rate, clear that Weitz 
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wanted his argument to be more comprehensive. His aim was to 
show that it is not possible to defi ne art at all.
The general lesson to be learned from this discussion of Weitz’ 
argument is that any conclusion about the normative producer 
understanding of ‘art’ cannot automatically be infl ated into a 
more comprehensive conclusion about the public meaning of 
‘art’. The implications for the status of the public meaning of ‘art’ 
that the radical interpretation approach has are, furthermore, in-
consistent with views that imply that it is impossible to give any 
kind of defi nition of art.
8. Danto’s philosophical defi nition
I have argued that the radical interpretation approach has a wid-
er focus than some traditional analyses of the concept of art. At 
this stage some might hold that there are other contemporary 
attempts to analyse the concept of art that has such a wide focus 
as well. I think, however, that there are important differences. 
In this section I will elucidate the radical interpretation strategy 
further by comparing it with Arthur Danto’s ‘philosophical’ defi -
nition of art.26
Danto’s starting point are post-Wittgensteinian objections to 
classical attempts to defi ne or break down the concept of art. 
Danto thinks that much of this criticism was presented within a 
traditional framework. According to Danto, when pop art came 
on the arena this framework lost its validity, with the conse-
quence that traditional discussions were left in confusion. What 
pop art in reality showed, Danto held, was that the debate had 
been too narrow:
It seemed to me that pop, however unlikely it may have appeared to 
those unsympathetic with it (to most of my friends who were artists, for 
example) had fi nally discovered the true form of the philosophical ques-
tion about art. Pop had made it possible for philosophers to address art 
philosophically. Instead of attempting to defi ne art as such, the problem, 
far more tractable, was to distinguish philosophically between reality 
and art when they resembled one another perceptually.27 
Danto thinks that in order to be able to evaluate and appreciate 
pop art as art, one has to widen the perspective. One can no longer 
use notions from the traditional framework. These frameworks 
are simply inadequate for the task of analysing pop art. One has 
to use other notions that are suitable for pop art, but such notions 
have to come from philosophy, not from traditional aesthetics.
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The two central philosophical ideas in Danto’s analysis of art is 
that a work of art must have representional content in the sense 
that it has to be about something, and that it has to embody that 
content.28 According to Danto, this analysis can be used to explain 
why something like Warhol’s famous brillo box is a work of art 
while ordinary Brillo cartons in supermarkets are not. The ordi-
nary cartons are not about anything, the only content they have 
are the soap pads inside. Warhol’s brillo box, on the other hand, 
is not about soaps. Warhol’s box has representational content. It 
might not be obvious what it represents, but what is important 
is that it invites interpretation. As long as it does, then it has rep-
resentional content that is different from the literal content the 
ordinary boxes have.
Danto thinks that if there is going to be a defi nition that cap-
tures both contemporary and earlier art, it has to be a defi nition 
along the lines just suggested:
If there is to be a defi nition of art that fi ts contemporary art as well as 
previous art, it has to be consistent not only with the fact that there are no 
limits on what can be art but also with the possibility that artworks and 
mere objects can resemble one another to any degree whatever.29
There are similarities between Danto’s views and the radical in-
terpretation approach. Both have a wide scope, and both think 
that there is something essential about art to be found within 
that scope. They are both opposed to relativism and Weitz’ ‘open 
concept’ idea, and none of the approaches seeks to defi ne art by 
focusing on resemblance or in any other traditional way.
But there the similarities stop. Danto’s defi nition is really an 
attempt to defi ne art in a classical way, in the sense that it aims to 
fi nd necessary and suffi cient condition for something to be art. 
The difference between Danto’s views and classical views is that 
Danto uses philosophical notions like representation and about-
ness in order to be able to include varieties of contemporary art.
The radical interpretation approach on the other hand in no 
way attempts to give necessary and suffi cient conditions for 
something to be art, it does not have a normative aim of this 
kind. What it does is to make a metaphysical claim about the un-
articulated meaning-explication in the common understanding 
of speakers of a language; the public meaning of ‘art’ is identical 
to this explication of ‘art’.
This difference raises an interesting issue. Danto’s aim is not to 
say what the public meaning of ‘art’ is. His aim is to fi nd a defi ni-
tion that fi ts the variety of art. But how is one supposed to know 
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when the defi nition is correct? It seems reasonable to suppose 
that insofar as some view on the nature of art is correct or not, 
its correctness cannot be judged solely against one’s own private 
understanding of ‘art’. For in that case the discussion would be 
purely subjective; one could choose the understanding one wants 
in the fi rst place and then fi nd an analysis that matches that un-
derstanding.
A more objective basis for evaluating attempts to defi ne the 
concept of art is needed, and it is hard to see how it could be 
incorrect to include the public meaning of ‘art’ in that basis. That 
is, after all, what one seeks to build the analysis on. It would, at 
any rate, be useful to know if a defi nition is consistent with the 
meaning of ‘art’. There are, therefore, good reasons for analysing 
the public meaning of ‘art’. Here at this the initial stage of the 
analysis, it seems to me, is where there is no help to be found in 
Danto’s views.
The radical interpretation approach on ‘art’ that I have out-
lined is aimed at this fi rst stage. It is focused on explicating what 
the English word ‘art’ means, what speakers of English mean by 
their ‘art’ utterances. Far from being incompatible with attempts 
to analyse the concept of art, the theory of radical interpretation 
therefore goes hand in hand with conceptual analysis. The ap-
proaches simply have different focuses. Conceptual analyses fo-
cus on fi nding necessary and suffi cient conditions for something 
to represent a normative understanding of ‘art’. The theory of 
radical interpretation, on the other hand, tells us what the public 
meaning of ’art’ metaphysically is, and how one should proceed 
in order to fi nd meaning-explications. Insofar as attempts to anal-
yse the concept of art aim to start out with this public meaning, 
radical interpretation is fundamentally important in aesthetics.
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